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	SUMMARY
	FAR EAST
3.	Enemy armor contacted in Chinese Communist sector (page 4).
5.	Communist China's railroad to Indochina reported completed (page 5).
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	policies (page 7).
	WESTERN EUROPE
11.	Spanish Monarchists seek control of strike movement (page 9).
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	FAR EAST	c.A
3.	Enemy armor contacted in Chinese Communist sector:	E //
	CINCFE Telecon A CINCFE telecon of 1 May reported that	
	1 May 51 five enemy tanks attacked six miles northeast SECRET of Seoul and that UN aircraft observed seven-	
	teen more in enemy rear areas.	
	Comment: Although there have been almost	
	continuous air sightings of enemy armor since January, scarcely any	
	ground contacts have been reported during this period. This tank con-	
	tact is reported in the sector occupied by the Chinese Communist 3rd Army Group, previously reported as having received armored support	
	in Manchuria. Two major North Korean armored units are also known	
	to be located in western North Korea.	
	An 11 April Far East Command analysis of	
	enemy tank sightings revealed 82 sightings in western Korea south of	
	Pyongyang for the period from 16 March to 10 April. In the light of previous experience indicating that air sightings fail to account for more	
	than 50 percent of actual armored strength, this same analysis estimated	
	that the enemy may have at least 150 to 175 tanks for future employment along the more favorable west coast road net.	
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9. -	Communist China's railroad to Indochina reported completed:	CHIN
	Us cons Gen Hong Kong An untested source has informed the US Consu	1
	30 Apr 51 General in Hong Kong that the railroad from CONFIDENTIAL Laipin (in Kwangsi province) to the Indochina	
	border at Chennankuan has been completed by	
	using rails taken from a section of another line in Kweichow province. The source alleges that the line from Nanning to the Indochina border	•
	is the same narrow gauge that is used in Indochina railroads.	•
	<u>Comment:</u> This line was previously reported	
	scheduled for completion by the end of April.	
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3.	Petroleum being shipped to Communist China from Indonesia:	CHINA INDONES
	US Cons Gen Hong Kong The US Consul General in Hong Kong reports	N DO.
	5 Apr 51 that the tightening of Singapore's export regu-	e
	CONFIDENTIAL lations <u>have</u> led to an organized movement of goods from Singapore to Indonesia for trans-	1.1
	shipment to Hong Kong, Macao, or directly to Communist China. The	
	Consul General states that, although the trade is not large as yet, operations may become larger in scale. He mentions in particular the move-	
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	ment of petroleum products via this route, and says that mounting evi-	

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	Comment: US officials in Singapore as Kong have been reporting information (which they evaluate as pretrue) concerning the planned delivery of a large quantity of motoline or crude oil to Macao, possibly from Indonesia.	robably	
	possibly if the industrial		50
	NEAR EAST		
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8. UN Secretary-General Lie cautions Israel on its international policies: 158111

US Emb Tel Aviv

According to the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv

30 Apr 51 SECRET According to the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv, UN Secretary-General Lie has discussed with Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett the present unsatisfactory situation in the Middle East.

Referring to the dangers arising from Israel's hatred of the Arab States and to the lack of progress in improving that situation, Lie advised the Israeli Foreign Minister (1) to follow a milder policy in international relations, (2) to abide by the UN decisions, and (3) while retaining a necessary independence, to avoid any course that would lessen Israel's friendship with the US. Lie stressed the importance to Israel of American goodwill, citing the Hule controversy -- particularly the retaliatory bombing -- as an example of unwise policies which might jeopardize US goodwill.

Comment: Domestic considerations within Israel -- such as the strong Israeli nationalism, the influence upon Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of General Yadin, Army Chief of Staff, and the problems involved in a general election this summer -- have made it difficult for the government to pursue a moderate foreign policy, particularly in regard to Israel's relations with the Arab States. Lie's advice, however, may have some effect in improving Israel's attitude toward the UN Truce Supervision Organization and the various Mixed Armistice Commissions.

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11. Spanish	Monarchist	s seek conti	rol of strike	movement:		
US Emb M	l adrid	The US	Embassy i	n Madrid re	ports that, d	espite
29 Apr 51 SECRET		previou munist	s denials, to opposition (the secretar Comite Inter	y of the non- rior de Coord organization	Com- dina-
		_ 9) _		-	,
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behind the Barcelona and Bilbao strikes. The CIC is planning a further series of non-violent strikes culminating in a general sit-down strike in Madrid during the month of May synchronized with the issuance of a Monarchist manifesto calling on Franco to turn over the government to the Pretender Don Juan.

Comment:

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the CIC, a coalition of clandestine Monarchist, Socialist and Anarchist organizations within Spain, does not appear justified in claiming credit for instigating or directing the Barcelona and Bilbao strikes. Monarchists within the CIC, who sense the latent possibilities of the strike movement, apparently are anxious to use it as a lever for the immediate ouster of Franco and the restoration of the monarchy under Don Juan. On the other hand, the non-Monarchist elements of the CIC, who have a more intimate grasp of the aspirations of Spanish workers, counsel caution, since they feel that any undue haste might well jeopardize their cause by affording Franco a pretext for a new series of repressive measures that could break the back of the non-violent strike movement before it gains momentum.